To create a fully functional HS-14 or HS-15 ICBM North Korea would need more than a dozen test launches to ensure the missing technologies were now present and working. The missing techs are the more difficult ones that require more engineering and scientific resources than the basic multi-stage rocket. Nothing as exciting as rockets blasting off when it comes to reentry vehicle and its contents. Until North Korea succeeds in that last endeavor and conducts multiple tests that obviously work will there be any hope of a serious threat. But then comes yet another challenge.The article points out that the HS-14/15 are liquid-fueled missiles akin to the American Atlas, a weapon that went out of service fifty years ago.
Even with a reliable Hwasong-14 or 15 ICBM North Korea would need more than a dozen of them, launched simultaneously, to have any chance of getting past the existing American GBI (Ground Based Interceptor) anti-missile missiles based in Alaska.
In essence, NK is running a con on everyone in the region, as they have before. But this time, it shows signs of not working.
7 comments:
There is a reason they call very difficult things "rocket science".
-Doug in Oakland
This suits the Russians and Chinese in that order. The HW15 is a Titan II analog without a powered third stage (keeps them street legal). Solid rocket motors are up next. This is the guy running the flight test program: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/revealed-middle-aged-rocket-scientist-11116099
Food prices are stable. https://www.38north.org/2017/11/bksilberstein111417/
They have their views on the missile deal: https://www.38north.org/2017/11/bksilberstein111417/
The WW2 V2 rocket didn't have a reentry problem. So what exactly IS the problem?
The V-2 was a long-range missile by the standards of its day. Not now. ICBMs reach orbital velocities, so the warhead has to withstand the reentry of a descending satellite.
Also, there are guidance issues. V-2s had no terminal guidance. That doesn't work with an ICBM.
“Vonce the Rocket goes up
Who cares where it comes down?
That’s not my department.”
Says Werner Von Braun.
Actually got to talk to him as part of a high school group, via speakerphone, back in the late 70s.
While the ICBM threat is mostly overblown, the miniaturized warhead issue is not. The Soviets loved them some suitcase bombs, and the NORK’s would love some too. Something nice and portable, and thus capable of being screened from easy detection by a small enclosure.
As we’ve seen in Australia this month, there are NK loyalists out there, Lets say the SS Minnow is steaming from Indonesia to South Korea with bananas. Then it loads electronics for return to Indonesia, and after leaving South Koreans waters is met by a small North Korean fishing vessel who loads a suitcase device or two. When the SS Minnow transits the busy shipping lanes near Indonesia, it transfers the device(s) to ship(s) bound for various locations. After a few trips, the NORKs have small devices, in the .1 to 2 kiloton range, in a number of strategic locations. The Soviets had such devices with estimated effective lifespans of 30 years in the 80’s.
Now you have the NORKs able to say, through quiet channels, you attack us, we have a surprise(s) for you. The fireball radius for such a device is small, but a simple radioactive casing modification would massively increase the threat. Thus, we have a new version of MAD, with the NORKs gaining security by threatening a small, undefined group of world citizens. The final question would be, do we believe them, or do we risk disbelieving them?
Dark Angel,
My dad worked with some of the guys brought over from Operation Paperclip back in the mid `50s on the Jupiter missile project, when they were first sketching out the ideas for a rocket that became the Saturn series.
Years later, when asked about what he had thought about the Germans, Dad said that he thought they were suffering from advanced cases of brain damage.
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