The Opinions of Some Others

There have been some rather critical op-eds about Der Monkey Fuhrer's War.

One was printed in yesterday's New York Times. It was not written by some guru from think tank or an academic. It was written by seven soldiers, and by that I do not mean officers.

This is a quote from it, and click on the quote to read the entire piece:

The most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

Nice going, Chimpy.

So now, the view of an academic:

In history, the most important consequences are often the unintended ones. We do not yet know the longer-term unintended consequences of Iraq. Maybe there is a silver lining hidden somewhere in this cloud. But as far as the human eye can see, the likely consequences of Iraq range from the bad to the catastrophic.

Bravo, Shooter and Rummy. Way to go, you Kagans.

As Bill Maher said: You can't call yourself a think tank if all your ideas are stupid. It is no secret that the Surge is a plan that did not originate from the military. It originated from the American Warcrime Heritage Institute. It originated from the very same people who dreamed up this clusterfuck, the very same people who thought it was not necessary to plan for the occupation of Iraq, the same people who thought that the Iraqis would come out into the streets, start singing "Kumbaya" and form a secular democracy if only we guided them a little. And it is no secret that Bush started firing generals until he found one who would salute his little plan.

It is also no secret that, given the rotation scheme of 15 months in Iraq, 12 months home, that the Surge will end next spring, as there are not the troops to keep it going. Everybody knows this.

And, from what I can see, the discussion of what happens next is as lacking as the discussion was about what would would happen after Saddam was deposed. It is shaping up to look like this: